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The Need for Debt Relief:
How Debt Servicing Leads to Violations of State Obligations under the ICESCR
by Noel G. Villaroman*

T

Introduction

U.S. $210 million in debt repayments every month, represents
the amount of wealth transferred from these poor countries to
the developed world. More specifically, however, there is an
actual human cost behind these seemingly innocuous figures:
real people and real lives adversely affected by huge debt servicing, including children who had to stop studying because their
government imposed school fees they could not afford; families
who reside in makeshift shelters because their government could
not provide affordable housing; and infants who died because
the government lacks adequate programs to address malnutrition
and disease.

he aim of this article is to illustrate how the large
repayments of external debts undermine a debtor country’s ability to comply with its obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)1 and to argue that adequate debt relief to the poorest debtor countries is imperative. First, this article will briefly
introduce the magnitude and extent of developing countries’
external debt problem. Second, it will argue that creditor countries have human rights obligations beyond their borders to the
people of debtor countries, based on the states’ legal duty to
engage in “international cooperation and assistance.” Third, it
will identify a State Party’s obligations under the ICESCR and
demonstrate how making huge debt repayments infringe on
these obligations. Fourth and finally, this article will propose
that adequate debt relief — in the form of a substantial reduction of outstanding external debts — be granted to the poorest of
debtor countries in order to allow them to progressively realize
the economic, social, and cultural (ESC) rights of their people.

“Extra-Territorial” Human Rights Obligations
Creditor Countries for the People of Debtor
Countries: The Urgent Need for Debt Relief

of

It is traditionally asserted that states assume the responsibility of realizing human rights by ratifying human rights instruments, thus creating a “vertical” relationship between the state
as the duty-bearer and its people as the rights-holders. However,
in recent years, scholars have advocated the idea that human
rights transcend national boundaries.8 They argue that one state
may be held liable, at least in theory, for human rights violations
committed in the territory of another. Although still controversial, such a “horizontal” dimension of human rights has since
gained support from many human rights experts.9

External Debts Owed by Developing Countries
The World Bank lists 134 low- and middle-income countries
that report to its Debtor Reporting System and had outstanding
arrears in their external debt servicing as of June 2008.2 Out
of these 134 developing countries, 42 are considered heavily
indebted poor countries (HIPCs) because their level of indebtedness has become unmanageable relative to their capacity to pay.3
Consequently, they satisfy the criteria of the “HIPC Initiative,” a
mechanism created and managed by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to grant debt relief to HIPCs.4
The remaining 92 countries have varying levels of external debt
which, according to the IMF and the World Bank, is “sustainable” and therefore ineligible for any debt relief.

Scholars have attempted to advance this horizontal dimension in both civil and political rights and ESC rights areas.
With respect to civil and political rights, scholars Mark Gibney,
Katarina Tomasevski, and Juns Vested-Hansen argue that states
that aided and abetted violations of civil and political rights in
another state do incur “transnational state responsibility.”10 Their
analysis is confined to violations of civil and political rights, for
example, when a developed state manufactures and exports arms
or torture implements to another state, which in turn uses them
to repress its own people. On the other hand, with respect to
ESC rights, Asbjorn Eide, the former Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food, has argued that “[s]tates have obligations also to
the peoples of other [s]tates and to the international community
. . . derived from provisions found within human rights law and
from a set of principles of international law.”11 In the same vein,
human rights scholar Sigrun Skogly contends that developed
states have “transnational human rights obligations” to respect
the ESC rights of the people of developing countries, citing customary international law and ICESCR provisions for support.12

Over recent decades, the external debt owed by the developing countries as a group has increased significantly. Low- and
middle-income countries’ external debts rose from U.S. $500
billion in 1980, to U.S. $1 trillion in 1985, and to more than U.S.
$2 trillion in 2003.5 It increased again to U.S. $3.125 trillion in
2006.6 Between 2000 and 2005, 29 of the world’s poorest countries paid around U.S. $15.3 billion to service their combined
external debts.7 This figure, which roughly translates to about
* Noel G. Villaroman is a defense attorney from the Philippines.
He obtained an LL.M. in international human rights law from the
University of Notre Dame in the United States in 2006. He is currently
an LL.M. (by research) candidate at Monash University in Melbourne,
Australia.

Both Eide13 and Skogly14 expressly recognized that the
“extraterritorial” obligations of developed countries to respect
ESC rights in developing countries directly stem from the legal
duty of international cooperation and assistance. Articles 55 and
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56 of the UN Charter15 are the most categorical and authoritative
sources of the duty of international cooperation and assistance
among states. This duty directs them to effectively cooperate
with one another in order to achieve the goals set forth in the UN
Charter, including the realization of human rights. International
law scholar Louis Sohn argues that Articles 55 and 56 carry the
force of positive international law and impose clear obligations
that all UN Member States must fulfill.16 Indeed, states have
consented to be bound by the duty of international cooperation
and assistance by ratifying the UN Charter, which according to
Louis Henkin, “epitomize[s] the principle of consent.”17

Human rights commentator Stephen Marks places heavy significance on the Article 2(1) duty “to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and cooperation” as providing a
legal basis for reciprocal obligations between and among States
Parties to the ICESCR.21 According to Marks, this duty provides
the ICESCR a “horizontal” dimension which presupposes the
existence of an obligation among the States Parties inter se, as
opposed to a mere “vertical” dimension that involves obligations
owed by a State Party to its own population. Marks argues that
each State Party has legal obligations “not only to alter its internal policy but also to act through international cooperation and
assistance toward the same end.”22

In addition to Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, the duty
of international cooperation and assistance also finds its legal
basis in several provisions of the ICESCR. First among these is
the clause “to take steps, individually and through international
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical” found in Article 2(1).18 The second provision is Article
11(1) which mandates that States Parties fulfill the “right to an
adequate standard of living” for their people, while recognizing
“the essential importance of international co-operation based on
free consent” to achieve this goal. The last provision is Article
11(2) which, although concerning the specific “right to be free
from hunger,” directs States Parties to take steps “individually
and through international co-operation” to fulfill this right.
Interpreting the duty of international cooperation and assistance, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR), the body of independent experts that monitors the
implementation of the ICESCR by its States Parties,19 stated,

In the context of the external debt problem, creditor countries’ extraterritorial human rights obligations imply that they
are legally bound to ensure that their debt-related policies do
not adversely affect the fulfillment of human rights in debtor
countries. On this point, Skogly argues that creditor countries
“are obliged to consider how individual projects, programs,
and policies may affect the population in the countries where
they are to be implemented and to alter them when necessary to
avoid possible human rights violations.”23 Speaking generally
about the monetary policies being pursued by creditor countries,
Sanjay Reddy similarly argues that “substantial external effects
of monetary decisions can generate obligations to take into
account the concerns of non-citizens or justify claims on the part
of non-citizens that they be consulted about, or included in the
making of, the decisions.”24
What is expected, therefore, is prudence and foresight by the
creditor countries to ensure that their actions with transnational
ramifications do not undermine or frustrate efforts of debtor
countries towards ESC rights realization. Before engaging in
an activity or adopting a policy that has transnational ramifications, creditor countries must exercise due diligence and defer or
discontinue a policy if there are reasonable grounds to suspect
that it will bring adverse consequences to the debtor countries.

In accordance with Articles 55 and 56, . . . with wellestablished principles of international law, and with the
provisions of the [ICESCR] itself, international cooperation for development and thus for the realization of
economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of
all States. It is particularly incumbent upon those States
which are in a position to assist others in this regard.20
3
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Creditor countries’ hardened insistence on continued debt repayments, which weaken a debtor country’s ability to fulfill its
ICESCR obligations to its people, as the next section will demonstrate, must be subjected to this due diligence requirement.

“minimum core requirements” of each right; and (3) not to
retrogress in their realization, which would constitute a prima
facie violation of the ICESCR. The following sub-sections will
discuss how debt servicing negatively impacts each of these
obligations.

Article 2(1) of the ICESCR and
“Progressive Realization” of ESC Rights

Debt Servicing and the Obligation to Devote
the “Maximum of Available Resources”

Under the ICESCR, States Parties are not expected to immediately bring about the full realization of the rights recognized
therein. Instead, they may realize these rights step-by-step and
over a period of time. This is the essence of the CESCR’s notion
of “progressive realization.”25 The language of Article 2(1)
reflects both the utopian goal of full realization and the harsh
reality of resource constraints.26

The obligation to devote the maximum available resources to
the realization of ESC rights is expressly provided for by Article
2(1) of the ICESCR. However, the question is whether States
Parties infringe on this obligation by prioritizing debt repayments
over social expenditures that promote ESC rights. Analysis of
this issue depends on whether the amounts allocated to States
Parties’ debt repayments are part of their “available resources”
within the intent of Article 2(1). If so, the question remains
whether States Parties have absolute discretion over how they
should allocate their available resources, or whether allocation
of available resources is subject to review under the ICESCR.

Article 2(1) has been described as the lynchpin of the obligations of States Parties to the ICESCR.27 Notwithstanding
its phraseology and claims to the contrary,28 Article 2(1) does
not imply that States Parties do not have immediate obligations towards full realization. Rather, the Limburg Principles
on the Implementation of the ICESCR (Limburg Principles),
a set of interpretative guidelines on the implementation of the
Covenant,29 proscribe States Parties from indefinitely delaying
the full realization of ESC rights and require their realization as
expeditiously as possible.30

The first step requires a determination of what constitutes
“available resources” as intended by the ICESCR drafters.
Human rights scholars Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn went
back to the ICESCR’s travaux preparatoires to conclude that the
term “available resources” should be interpreted in its broadest sense.32 They found general agreement among the drafters
that available resources should include both available national
and international resources.33 Likewise, the Limburg Principles
understood the phrase “its available resources” as referring to
both state resources and “those available from the international
community through international co-operation and assistance.”34
Moreover, the CESCR ascribes the same meaning to the phrase
“the maximum of its available resources” as that adopted by the
Limburg Principles.35

This obligation is further bolstered by General Comment
No. 3, which identifies two immediate obligations on the state
despite resource constraints: (1) the “undertaking to guarantee”
that the relevant rights “will be exercised without discrimination;” and (2) the undertaking “to take steps . . . to the maximum
of available resources.” Further, the CESCR holds that the latter
obligation cannot be delayed because it “in itself, is not qualified
or limited by other considerations.”31
Three separate and distinct obligations spring from Article
2(1) of the ICESCR: (1) to use “maximum available resources”
towards the realization of ESC rights; (2) to immediately fulfill

Some argue, to the contrary, that the money an indebted
country owes another country or international organization is
4

a resource not to be included in the “maximum of its available
resources” meant for the full realization of ICESCR rights.36
Implicit in this argument is the claim that a State Party is as
much under a legal obligation to respect its financial agreements,
such as loan contracts, with other countries as its obligations
under the ICESCR. Writing on the human rights obligations of
international organizations, Sabine Michalowski argues that this
position ignores that contractual obligations do not necessarily
mean that “funds . . . are therefore not at the free disposition of
the debtor” and thus available for its use.37 In the same vein, Eric
Friedman argues that such interpretation of available resources
would mean that States Parties have a greater duty to meet their
debt obligations than their obligations to their people.38 This
“perverse implication,” Friedman argues, makes a mockery of
the centrality of human rights as enshrined in the UN Charter.39

show that adequate consideration has been given to the possible
resources available to satisfy each of the Covenant’s requirements, even if the effort was ultimately unsuccessful.”47
If States Parties are expected to seek and pool resources from
international sources to arrive at “the maximum of its available
resources,” then there is all the more reason for States Parties
to look for sources right in their own backyards by reevaluating
resource allocation to channel more to ICESCR expenditures if
available resources are found to be insufficient. This reorientation of national budget priorities is supported by the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP).48 Rather than allocate
more than half of spending on military, debt repayments, inefficient state enterprises, and mistargeted social subsidies, the
UNDP urges governments to restructure their budget allocations
to prioritize ICESCR expenditures.49

In his seminal article on “maximum available resources,”
human rights expert Robert Robertson identifies financial,
natural, human, technological, and informational resources as
the most important in achieving ESC rights.40 He first asks
whether a resource is potentially available for ICESCR use,
and then determines whether that resource should be available
for ICESCR use.41 The latter is a more difficult question that
requires a State Party to make a value judgment.

Like military spending, debt repayments are expenditures
which should take the back seat if they conflict with a State
Party’s obligations under the ICESCR. This is not to say, however, that States Parties must completely neglect their military
and defense requirements or wantonly violate their duty to repay
under an international loan agreement. Rather, it is incumbent
upon them, in situations other than where there is extreme deprivation, to adequately justify divergence from the priorities set
by the ICESCR. The Limburg Principles support this point by
providing that “due priority shall be given to the realization of
rights recognized in the Covenant, mindful of the need to assure
to everyone the satisfaction of subsistence requirements as well
as the provision of essential services.”50 A State Party that fails
to convincingly justify its divergence from this priority fails to
comply with its obligation to devote “the maximum of its available resources” to ESC rights.

Regarding what resources are potentially available for
ICESCR use, Robertson argues that “all domestic resources
must be considered for use by the state, and all available international resources must be obtained.”42 According to Robertson,
because human rights theoretically enjoy priority over all other
considerations, states should muster all resources needed for
their satisfaction.43 Robertson cites the reports of Danilo Turk,
the Special Rapporteur on the Realization of ESC Rights, who
also suggested a broad interpretation of resource availability
for the purpose of realizing the rights in the ICESCR.44 Turk
recognizes not only the need to gather together all domestic and
international resources but also, and more importantly, the need
for States Parties to allow the use of private resources to contribute towards realizing ESC rights.45

A State Party’s decision to allocate its available resources in
a manner it sees fit, therefore, is reviewable in the light of its
human rights commitments under the ICESCR. Matthew Craven,
a commentator on the ICESCR, notes that some members of
the CESCR have used the ratio between a country’s expenditures on social services and its gross national product (GNP)
or gross domestic product (GDP) to gauge compliance with the
Covenant.51 Ultimately, in view of its potential impact on rights
recognized in the ICESCR, resource allocation is too important a
matter to be left to the unfettered discretion of States Parties.

Based on the foregoing, government allocations for debt servicing are part and parcel of a State Party’s available resources.
Following Robertson’s analysis, one could argue that allocations
for debt servicing should be first made available for ICESCR
use. Robertson opines that there are two standards for this
analysis: one standard is used if there is an extreme deprivation
of ESC rights in the debtor country, and the second if there is no
extreme deprivation.

Debt Servicing and “Minimum Core Obligations”
While Article 2(1) of the ICESCR does not mention “minimum core obligations,” the term’s invention proved useful in the
CESCR’s work, specifically in monitoring the performance of
States Parties.52 Its progenitor is paragraph 25 of the Limburg
Principles, which provides that States Parties have the responsibility to ensure minimum subsistence rights for everyone,
regardless of the state’s level of economic development.53
The CESCR subsequently modified this principle by making
resource constraints a valid justification for non-compliance.54

Where there is extreme deprivation — which for Robertson is
akin to a failure to meet minimum core requirements — a state
has an obligation “to intrude without limit into both private and
state resources previously used for other purposes, in order to
ensure that its population receives ‘core’ entitlements.”46 In this
situation, amounts allocated for debt servicing like all other state
resources previously used for other purposes may be diverted and
channeled to ICESCR expenditures to avoid extreme deprivation.

The relationship between minimum core obligations and
minimum essential levels is clear: a State Party must meet a
minimum core obligation to ensure the minimum essential levels
of every right in the ICESCR. Each minimum core obligation
contains the minimum standards a state must comply with to

Where there is no extreme deprivation, Robertson adopts
the approach of Alston and Quinn who propose to subject the
States Parties’ determination of their “available resources” to
a “process requirement by which [they] might be requested to
5

meet its ESC rights obligations.55 Minimum essential levels of
a right, on the other hand, are defined by Fons Coomans as the
“essential elements without which a right loses its substantive
significance as a human right.”56
According to the CESCR, for a State Party to legitimately
blame the failure to meet its minimum core obligations on the
lack of available resources, “it must demonstrate that every
effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum
obligations.”57 The Committee’s statement makes the “lack of
available” resources an exculpatory defense that a State Party
may plead to justify its failure to perform its minimum core
obligations. To overcome the prima facie presumption, the burden of proof rests upon the State Party to show that “every effort
has been made to use all resources . . . to satisfy [those obligations] as a matter of priority.” This defense is successful only if
States Parties can prove that, above all other considerations and
despite all their other commitments, they have chosen to use
“all resources” to satisfy those obligations. Thus, a State Party
that prioritized debt servicing in the midst of widespread hunger and disease of its people will not overcome the prima facie
presumption. This analysis is important because it corresponds
with the standard that Robertson proposed for determining what
resources should be made available when people lack minimum
core entitlements.

Graph 1: Total debt servicing and total education expenditures, in
USD millions, 2000–2005.59

Graph 2: Total debt servicing and total health expenditures, in
USD millions, 2000–2005.60

There is, however, a different view espoused in the Limburg
Principle that the minimum core obligations are required of States
Parties regardless of their level of economic development. In other
words, lack of resources is not a valid defense for failure to satisfy minimum essential levels of ICESCR rights. The Maastricht
Guidelines similarly support the view that “[s]uch minimum core
obligations apply irrespective of the availability of resources of
the country concerned or any other factors and difficulties.”58

While the CESCR has not set specific benchmarks or indicators on the level of expenditures that States Parties should
devote to ensure minimum essential levels of a particular right,
it categorically stated that an “insufficient expenditure or misallocation of public resources which results in the non-enjoyment
of [a particular] right” is a violation of obligations under the
ICESCR.61 Developed and developing countries have the obligation to devote sufficient resources towards the realization of
ESC rights. Consequently, the CESCR criticized Canada for
allocating insufficient funds towards the right to adequate housing.62 As for measuring the sufficiency of financial resources,
Robertson suggested developing ratios that compare ICESCR
expenditures with expenditures that cannot claim priority over
ICESCR rights.63 Robertson concluded such comparisons on
government spending will lead to greater insight as to whether
a State Party has devoted its maximum available resources to
ESC rights.64

With this different view in mind, there is another way of
establishing the relationship between debt servicing and a State
Party’s ability to perform its minimum core obligations under
the ICESCR. In this approach, the lack of resources is not an
exculpatory defense but is instead the very reason why a State
Party fails to ensure the minimum essential levels of ESC
rights. Massive debt servicing depletes a State Party’s available
resources, rendering it unable to perform its minimum core
obligations under the ICESCR. Thus, when an indebted country
is unable to satisfy the minimum essential ESC rights because
debt repayments have severely drained its finances, it violates its
minimum core obligation under the ICESCR.
Satisfying the minimum essential levels of the right to education, for example, requires investments in physical infrastructure, appropriation of salaries for teachers, funds for their continuous training, and so on. A State Party will find it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to fulfill these minimum essential
levels if debt servicing enjoys the same or even greater priority
in national budgeting than education expenditures. To illustrate,
Graph 1 compares the total debt servicing amounts and total
education expenditures of eight heavily indebted poor countries
between 2000 and 2005. For comparison with another area of
ESC rights, Graph 2 shows total debt servicing amounts higher
than total health expenditures in eleven heavily indebted countries between 2000 and 2005.

Retrogressive Measures as Prima Facie Violations of
the ICESCR and Debt Servicing
A third and separate obligation is for State Parties to avoid
retrogressive measures that will hinder or halt the continuous
improvement of ESC rights. Human right scholar Magdalena
Sepulveda defined a deliberate retrogressive measure as any that
“implies a step back in the level of protection accorded to the
rights contained in the Covenant which is the consequence of an
intentional decision by the State.”65 The obligation with respect
to retrogressive measures is a negative duty, or an obligation
to refrain from committing certain acts that have the effect of
impairing advancements in ESC rights.66
6

On the basis of their extraterritorial human rights
obligations — a necessary offshoot of their duty of
international cooperation and assistance — creditor
countries have a corresponding obligation not to
undermine or frustrate debtor countries’ efforts to realize
their peoples’ ESC rights. Creditor countries’ insistence
on debt repayments, despite the clearly adverse
impact on debtor countries’ ability to realize ESC
rights, is legally incompatible with such a duty.
The CESCR has criticized States Parties for their adoption
of retrogressive measures. For example, in its Concluding
Observation for Mauritius in 1994, the Committee stated its
concern over the reintroduction of fees for tertiary education, describing it as “a deliberate retrogressive step.”67 In
addition, in its Concluding Observation for Nigeria in 1998,
the Committee criticized the introduction of fees in primary
schools, hospital charges,68 and skyrocketing university fees
during the previous year.69

While a decrease in government expenditures for a particular
right is not a per se retrogressive measure, a sustained decrease
is usually to the detriment of ICESCR rights. Moreover, the
CESCR has frequently criticized States Parties when the proportion of their expenditures for social services declines relative to
its GDP.74 The Committee has also implied that a State Party may
be in violation of its ICESCR obligations if it cannot adequately
justify a reduced expenditure for a particular right.75 A researcher
with wide experience in human rights law, Brigit Toebes, argued
that “[g]iven the fact that Article 2(1) speaks of ‘progressive
realization,’ a cut back in the expenses is difficult to justify and
requires a heavy burden of proof on the part of States.”76

Insofar as retrogressive measures are limitations on rights,
the ICESCR imposes an additional requirement that they
should be “determined by law . . . and solely for the purpose
of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”70
In General Comment No. 13, the CESCR clarified the nature
of retrogressive measures as prima facie violations of the
ICESCR.71 A State Party adopting a retrogressive measure
can overcome the presumption that such a measure is impermissible if it can prove three criteria: (1) the measure was
introduced only as a last resort after carefully considering all
alternatives; (2) it is fully justified “by reference to the totality of the rights” in the ICESCR; and (3) it is fully justified
“in the context of the full use of the State Party’s maximum
available resources.”

Conclusions and Recommendations:
Proposing an International Debt Restructuring
Mechanism That Respects and Promotes
ESC Rights in Debtor Countries
Massive debt repayments undermine the capacity of the
poorest debtor countries to perform their obligations under the
ICESCR. First, a debtor country that diverts its resources to debt
servicing and fails to use them optimally (“to the maximum”)
to realize ESC rights violates the ICESCR. Second, when a
debtor country fails to satisfy the minimum essential levels of
these rights because debt repayments have drained its finances,
it also violates the ICESCR. Third and finally, a debtor country
that deliberately adopts a retrogressive measure in order to save
and allocate more funds for debt repayments also breaches the
Covenant. On the basis of their extraterritorial human rights
obligations — a necessary offshoot of their duty of international cooperation and assistance — creditor countries have a
corresponding obligation not to undermine or frustrate debtor
countries’ efforts to realize their peoples’ ESC rights. Creditor
countries’ insistence on debt repayments, despite the clearly
adverse impact on debtor countries’ ability to realize ESC rights,
is legally incompatible with such a duty.

The relationship between debt servicing and the adoption
of retrogressive measures is an indirect one. Certain levels of
debt servicing severely deplete a country’s resources, which
then leads to the adoption of retrogressive measures, including
inter alia, the imposition of certain fees on social services. For
example, school fees and related costs are a hindrance to realizing the right to education for children in many countries. A
2001 World Bank survey found that such fees are being levied
in 77 out of 79 low-income countries.72 In countries without
formal fees, the survey found that public schools imposed
“informal fees” to make up for the lost revenue.73
7

excluding members of the legislature and other elected officials
who are directly accountable to the people. Finally and perhaps
most importantly, a fair international debt restructuring process
must ensure that the taxpayers of a debtor country would only
pay those debts that have actually redounded to their benefit.
If the loaned money did not in fact reach them or, worse, was
used to oppress them, then it would be the height of injustice to
require them to repay it.

Providing adequate debt relief to debt-distressed countries is one way creditor countries may observe their duty
of international cooperation and assistance. The most recent
expression of creditor countries’ adherence to this duty is the
declaration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).77
Specifically, one MDG demands dealing comprehensively
with the debt problems of developing countries through
national and international measures to make debt more sustainable in the long run. The Millennium Declaration reiterates the need for creditor countries to engage in effective
international cooperation through “a global partnership for
development.”78 Renowned economist Jeffrey Sachs posits
that such a global partnership requires tackling the poorest
countries’ national debt through debt relief and cancellation.79
Sachs’s point confirms the weakness of present mechanisms
designed to solve the unsustainable level of developing countries’ external debts. Diffused and uncoordinated, the present
mechanisms suffer from serious flaws, at least from the perspective of the peoples of debtor countries.80

The ultimate aim of any debt restructuring is to make the
burden sustainable in the long run,84 either through cancellation
or reduction of a particular class of debts. Assessing the sustainable level of indebtedness is, therefore, crucial in any restructuring process. Once ascertained, this level will help to determine
the sufficient amount of debt relief and the reorganization plan
most suited to the debtor country’s circumstances. This plan is
successful if it allows a debtor country a “fresh start” similar
to what domestic bankruptcy procedures provide individual or
corporate debtors. Under the current mechanisms, debt sustainability analysis is carried out exclusively by the creditors
themselves, using an arbitrary formula and employing their own
analysis of a debtor country’s economic condition.

In November 2009, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) warned that developing
countries’ debt burdens would increase by over seventeen
percent in 2010.81 This debt burden, according to UNCTAD,
has adverse effects on the economic growth of developing
countries and jeopardizes their capacity to meet the MDGs.
UNCTAD also warned of the negative impact of high debt
burden on 49 least developed countries.82 This negative prognosis was despite the debt restructuring mechanisms that have
been in operation for years. For many debtor countries, incurring unsustainable external debt is a chronic problem, and the
existing mechanisms only offer palliative relief. The only logical conclusion is that such mechanisms are seriously deficient
in achieving their main objectives — namely, to get a debtor
country out of debt crisis and to prevent similar predicaments
in the future.

Fair international debt restructuring mechanisms for developing countries ought to, rather, take into consideration other
possible “evidence” of the level of debt that a debtor country can
realistically sustain without sacrificing important ESC rightsrelated expenditures. Such an important issue should not be left
to the unfettered discretion of the creditors alone. While creditors’ sustainability analyses should be one factor, they should
not be the only assessments of a debtor country’s economic
situation. To this end, debt sustainability analyses should ideally
be performed by an independent body of experts, preferably a
UN agency or some judicial bankruptcy court. At the very least,
a proposed international debt restructuring mechanism ought to
independently determine a debtor country’s level of sustainable
debts after hearing and considering “evidence” presented by
both the creditors and the debtor country.

Therefore, this article proposes the establishment of a new
international debt restructuring mechanism that will comprehensively resolve the debtor countries’ repayment difficulties
while, at the same time, respecting the state’s obligation to
realize the ESC rights of its people. Reforming the external
debt restructuring process for developing countries is not a
novel idea; it has occupied public policy debates regarding
sovereign lending and borrowing since the late 1970s, when
the first symptoms of the debt overhang became manifest.83
This article nevertheless continues the debate, highlighting the
need to prioritize ESC rights in any future international debt
restructuring mechanism.

An appropriate debt sustainability analysis should incorporate the need to prioritize ESC rights. Current mechanisms for
debt restructuring do not take into account the public expenditures needed to progressively realize the ESC rights of the debtor
state’s population. In the IMF and World Bank HIPC Initiative,
for example, a debtor country’s eligibility to receive debt relief
is based on purely economic measures: it fixes a ratio of 150
percent for a country’s debt-to-export levels or, if a country has
an unusually high level of exports, a ratio of 250 percent for
debt-to-government revenues.85 Critic Charles Mutasa observes
that “[t]he HIPC [I]nitiative’s focus on purely economic criteria
in assessing a country’s debt burden betrays an utter lack of
concern for human development and for the capacity of poor
countries to meet the needs of their own people.”86

Whatever form this new mechanism ultimately takes, it
must be capable of remedying a debtor country’s unsustainable level of indebtedness in a timely, transparent, and fair
manner. It is in the interest of all parties, but most crucial for
a troubled debtor country, to immediately establish restructuring terms that are aimed at sustainability and growth. It is also
important that the restructuring process be transparent, most
especially to the people of the debtor country. The existing
debt restructuring mechanisms are non-transparent because
only a limited group of officials from the debtor country’s
finance ministry or central bank takes part in the process,

Excluding ESC rights-related expenditures from debt sustainability analyses has led to steep declines over time in public
expenditures for services such as health and education. A new
type of analysis is needed to determine the sustainable threshold
of a debtor country’s debt stock by factoring in ESC rightsrelated required expenditures. Similarly, Anne Pettifor argues
that it is “necessary to develop reasonably precise principles for
8

study equated the sustainability of external debts with a debtor
country’s ability to meet the MDGs, while continually being able
to repay a reduced external debt stock.89

determining levels of debt sustainability that are consistent
with the protection of human rights.”87
This article proposes two appropriate guides to determine
the amount of a debtor country’s resources that must be
shielded from creditor claims. First, an insolvency mechanism
that aggregates the resources a debtor country requires to meet
the MDGs by 2015 would pin the financing needs of a debtor
country to these goals. UNDP previously proposed a broader
concept of debt sustainability that “satisfies the financial
requirements for achieving a sustainable growth path necessary for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.”88
Because each debtor country has unique levels of development and possesses different resources, these financing needs
necessarily vary from country to country. Although this is an
admittedly tedious task, it is not impossible. In fact, a previous

Second, an insolvency mechanism could aggregate the
amount of resources that a debtor country would need to satisfy
the minimum essential levels of each of the ESC rights. This
option is more difficult because, as discussed above, there is
no consensus on the minimum essential levels of each of the
ESC rights. Whether the first or second suggestion is adopted,
the basic idea is that either the MDGs or the minimum essential
levels of ESC rights are more appropriate benchmarks in an
independent debt sustainability analysis than purely economic
measures, such as debt-to-export or debt-to-revenue ratios, uniformly applied to debtor countries regardless of their level of
ESC rights’ realization.		
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